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Abstract:  
 
English land registration law is a work in progress. There remain important 
unresolved issues concerning the conceptual building blocks used in the Land 
Registration Act 2002. This article focusses on rights to correct the land register. It 
considers the place of such rights in the ordering of estates, interests, rights and 
equities; and makes proposals about the characteristics of these rights so as to 
produce an integrated, coherent regime which combines the blunt rule for the passing 
of property with a sophisticated remedial regime for its recovery. Having analysed 
the right to rectify, it concludes that the right to rectify shares such similarities with 
the ‘mere equity’ that this classification makes sense in explaining the current law. In 
terms of policy, however, this classification is inappropriate and reform is required. 
Potential options for such reform are considered. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The right to rectify the register occupies an uneasy position in the English land 
registration system. The system is designed to provide simplicity and certainty 
through a catalogue of rules about the passing of proprietary estates and interests in 
land, coupled with rules about their respective priorities. Enjoying a challenging 
relationship with those rules, the right to rectify, in certain circumstances, enables the 
restitution of rights that have been lost by a mistaken change to the register. 
Dissecting the right to rectify is important, not only practically in the application of 
statutory rules about title and priorities, but also conceptually in the understanding 
how the rules of property and restitution interact. This article therefore asks the 
central and seemingly simple question: what is the right to rectify?1 
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 The status of this right is far from clear in a number of important aspects. 
Clarification is required in relation to: the grounds which generate the right; its 
incidents; and its position in the hierarchy of rights in land. The answers proposed 
here, based on the existing state of legislation and case law, are not without significant 
challenges and the article consequently also addresses what the law ought to be. 
 The status of the right to rectify is a particularly pressing issue. Although 
recent cases testify that the classification of its status can have a direct practical 
bearing on outcome, the case law is not consistent. First, there are several different 
characterisations of the restitutionary rights to alter that are generated by registration 
pursuant to a void or voidable disposition. Second, the courts have displayed 
ambivalence towards the differentiation of void and voidable titles. Third, there is an 
unresolved inconsistency in the application of competing priority regimes. 
Furthermore, whilst the legislative provisions have a bearing and impose certain 
parameters, they do not provide an exhaustive or unequivocal response.  
 The Law Commission has recently published a consultation paper which 
recognises the uncertain nature of the right to rectify.2 It provisionally proposes to 
eliminate a single manifestation of this problem by eliminating one possible priority 
rule, but without positively specifying the applicable priority rule nor explaining the 
nature of the right.3 It does not, therefore, strike at the root of the issue and would 
permit current practical problems to continue unresolved. A more comprehensive 
approach is required. This article seeks to provide that comprehensive examination of 
the nature of the right to rectify, and thus provide a basis for informing judicial 
decision making, or, ideally, for the enactment of a tailored provision that brings 
greater clarity to the ordering of property rights in the Land Registration Act. 
 The article will begin, in Part 2, by presenting the statutory framework for re-
vesting title. In Part 3, we examine the nature of the right to rectify as it may be 
asserted against the recipient who takes over proprietorship directly in succession to 
the claimant. Part 4 addresses certain further issues that are contingent on the nature 
of the right to rectify. In Part 5, we turn to the enforceability of the right to rectify 
against remote recipients. We examine the various options for best classifying the 
right to rectify given the current state of the case law. Part 6 then considers proposals 
for reform, evaluating the solutions for in rem effect of the right to rectify. 
 
2. The Legislative Response to Vesting without Valid Consent 
 
The registration system has the difficult task of balancing the need for confidence in 
acquisition with the need for a recovery mechanism in case a change to the register 
causes a deprivation of property without consent. The Land Registration Act 2002 
(LRA) takes a rigid approach to vesting by registration in section 58, a provision 
which ensures that property passes regardless of any defects in the underlying 
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transfer, and even in the total absence of a transfer.4 The unrelenting rule of vesting 
by registration has its effects ameliorated through the recognition of some 
unregistered interests, claims to reverse a registered entry, and a state compensation 
scheme. But the allocation of title is only one dimension of the legal relations between 
the former owner and the new acquirer, and it is blunt and relatively uninformative. It 
must be supplemented by a further branch of law which adds a second dimension: the 
sophisticated and fact-sensitive statutory rules by which title can be reallocated under 
the judicial power to reverse a register entry. This branch of law secures to the 
claimant a right to a gain received by the defendant5 or a right to the reversal of the 
defendant’s enrichment6 and may appropriately be labelled as restitutionary. It is 
these restitutionary proprietary claims which demand attention as an integral 
component in the working of the system of allocating entitlements in land. 
 Restitution of property rights thus lost is obtained by means of the statutory 
proceedings to alter the register which embody the doctrine of ‘rectification’ and a 
particular subset of the doctrine of ‘updating’ following rescission. They are found in 
Schedule 4 of the LRA which authorises the court or the registrar to order a change to 
the register for three reasons: (a) to correct a mistake; (b) to bring the register up to 
date; and (c) to give effect to any estate, right or interested excepted from the effect of 
registration. Where a change under (a) prejudicially affects the title of a registered 
proprietor, the change is labelled ‘rectification’ which is the key criterion that secures 
eligibility for state compensation. Of these categories, we are concerned with (a) and 
(b).  
 The ground for rectification is the correction of a mistake. This article will 
proceed on the basis that mistake occurs in the case of a registration without any valid 
underlying mandate to procure such a registration.7 Accordingly it arises where the 
current proprietor failed to obtain a good disposition (valid consent in proper form) 
from a person having power to transfer (sufficient title, capacity and authority) or a 
good entitlement by operation of law. If the jurisdiction to rectify is made out, the 
court may order reversal of the entry, leaving the mistakenly-registered proprietor to 
claim state compensation: if, instead, the court declines rectification as a matter of 
discretion, it is the former proprietor who will be eligible for state compensation. 
 The legal consequences of a registration pursuant to a void transfer, or indeed 
where there is no putative transfer at all (as in cases of pure registry error), differ 
significantly from those applying to transfers that are merely voidable. Although the 
LRA does not elaborate on the class of events which fall within the ‘updating’ head of 
alteration, the Law Commission8 envisioned that  a register entry pursuant to a 
voidable transfer would not be mistaken in itself  but would become out of date 
insofar as it failed to reflect the new state of affairs once the transfer was set aside. 
The proceedings for changing the register entry are therefore ‘updating’ in nature, and 
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come without any entitlements to state compensation. The nature of the rights which 
arise in these circumstances will now be examined. 
 
3. Nature of the Right to Rectify as against the Immediate Recipient 
 
The statutory rules governing rectification explain concisely the effects of finding that 
the relevant grounds of recovery exist: the court may then order the registrar to rectify 
the register9 and the registrar comes under a duty to make the rectification.10 But the 
statute does not describe the attributes of the applicant’s right from the moment of its 
origin until the implementation of the court order..  In exploring the nature of the right 
to rectify, valuable inferences can be drawn from the right to rescind, whose nature 
has been thoroughly examined and whose incorporation into registered land through 
the updating power is accepted. This section will therefore begin with a brief, 
preliminary discussion of the right to rescind and its implementation through an 
updating alteration of the register. 
 
A: The Right to Rescind 
 
Putting the rules of registered land temporarily to one side, if a conveyance of 
unregistered land is tainted by impaired consent, then although it is subject to the 
power to set it aside, it undoubtedly passes the legal estate. That is true of a transfer 
made pursuant to a contractual obligation but it remains unconfirmed whether the 
same analysis extends to conveyances not pursuant to a contractual obligation.11 
Haecker, however, has put forward a forceful case for applying the same effect 
beyond contract cases to all cases of impaired consent conveyances, and argues that 
the impairment leads not to a trust springing up in favour of the transferor but merely 
a power to call back.12 
 First, she argues, such an interest is justified neither by the maxim that ‘equity 
regards as done that which ought to be done’, nor by an a fortiori argument from 
presumed resulting trusts. Secondly, the ‘power model’ avoids the problematic 
concurrence of an entitlement to impose personal liability alongside a vested 
proprietary right. Thirdly, the change of position defence, which is not easily applied 
in defeasance of vested proprietary interests, is facilitated under the power model 
through conditions on its exercise. In addition to these conceptual advantages, 
Haecker adds a practical advantage: exercising the power would involve 
communication with the defendant and thus avoid imposing any liability as 
constructive trustee while he remained unaware of the impairment.13 In unregistered 
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land, therefore, there are sound justifications for the view that a conveyance tainted by 
impaired consent, whether or not there is an underlying contract, does not give rise to 
an interest in land vesting in the transferor but only a power to recover. 
 The power theory is equally capable of application to registered land. That the 
property passes to a transferee despite the transferor’s impaired consent is bolstered 
by section 58 of the LRA which vests title by virtue of registration. The power to 
rescind nevertheless applies to registered land, and, once exercised through the 
judicial order setting aside the transfer, the transferor may seek the appropriate 
alteration of the register through the updating provision.14 
 In one exceptional case, however, it was held that, following a defective 
transfer of registered land, the claimant possessed not a mere power but a full 
immediate equitable interest under a trust. In Collings v Lee,15 a case of fraudulent 
misrepresentation, the Court of Appeal held that the claimant possessed a trust interest 
and was thus able to rely on priority rules to enforce the interest against a remote 
acquirer.16 The decision was given ex tempore on summary judgment and identifying 
the ground on which the court established the trust is not simple.17 As we discuss 
below, the approach taken in the more recent case of Swift18, although it relates to 
rectification rather than rescission, suggests that the trust approach is wrong. 
Consequently, the response of an immediate trust interest in Collings ought not be 
considered a universal template for the rights ensuing from a voidable transfer of 
registered land.19 
 If it is to survive, the decision in Collings must be narrowly confined to cause 
the least offence to the approach in Swift. We propose that this be achieved through an 
interpretation of Collings that the beneficial interest was attributable to the 
transferee’s wrongdoing rather than the impairment of the transferors’ consent. This is 
hinted at by the court’s words: ‘[t]he first defendant having acted as he did, the plain 
                                                                                                                                            
Charles Harpum, ‘Registered Land: A Law Unto Itself?’ in Joshua Getzler (ed), Rationalizing 
Property, Equity and Trusts: Essays in Honour of Edward Burn (OUP 2003) ch 9. The Privy 
Council had recognised this long ago: Assets Co. Ltd v Mere Roihi [1905] AC 176 (PC), 204-5 per 
Lord Lindley: ‘if the alleged cestui que trust is a rival claimant, who can prove no trust apart from 
his own alleged ownership, it is plain that to treat him as a cestui que trust is to destroy all benefit 
from registration. Here the plaintiffs set up an adverse title and nothing else; and to hold in their 
favour that there is any resulting or other trust entitling them to the property is, in their Lordships’ 
opinion, to do the very thing which registration is designed to prevent’. See also Swift 1st v Chief 
Land Registrar [2015] EWCA Civ 330, [2015] Ch 602. 
14 It has not been determined in registered land whether an order setting aside has the effect of 
creating a trust interest in the transferor and, if so, whether that interest is a precondition for the 
jurisdiction to update. 
15 [2001] 2 All ER 332 (COA). 
16 ibid [17]. It was said that, ‘...even where the transfer is obtained by fraudulent misrepresentation, 
the transferor nevertheless intends that the whole legal and beneficial ownership in the property 
shall pass to the transferee. But that was not this case. Mr and Mrs Collings did not intend to 
transfer the property to the first defendant and they did not intend to transfer it for no 
consideration. The first defendant acquired the property without their knowledge and consent and 
in breach of his fiduciary duty to them’. 
17 The possibility of explaining the case as fundamental mistake as to counterparty has been raised: 
Haecker, ‘Proprietary Restitution’ (n 12) n 87. That, however, may not do justice to the 
registration rules, as the vesting effect of section 58 applies regardless of the degree of impairment 
to consent. Impairments recognised as blocking transfer of legal title in unregistered land, such as 
fundamental mistake as to counterparty or as to subject matter or nature of the transaction, have no 
special status in registered land. 
18 Swift (n 13). 
19 For the same reasons, registered land should refuse to accept that a beneficial interest could be 
vested in a transferor by rescission out of court. 
fact is that no court of equity could allow him to assert a beneficial interest in the 
property as against Mr and Mrs Collings’.20 There were two potential wrongs on the 
facts: breach of fiduciary duty by the transferee who acted as the transferors’ agent21 
and the wrong of deception. These circumstances would satisfy the general conditions 
necessary for the imposition of a trust: namely, the transferee came under a legal duty 
to the transferor on account of his wrongdoing, and that duty pertained to a specific 
right held by the transferee. Upholding the Collings decision on this ground would 
displace the power model, but only in the specific case of a wrong committed by the 
transferee. Outside of wrongdoing, the power model should continue with full 
operation and unaffected by such matters as the ground for consent impairment, the 
degree of impairment, and whether the impairment is recognised in law or equity. 
 
B: The Right to Rectify 
 
The section above showed how the right to rescind a registered transfer is best 
understood as a power unless there is wrongdoing. It set the foundation to develop a 
similar analysis in relation to the right to rectify the register following a void transfer 
where a former owner’s right to rectify comes into competition with the new 
proprietor’s title under section 58. Because the operation of section 58 does not 
differentiate between voidable and void transfers, the competition must be resolved in 
the same way and for the same reasons as for the right to rescind, by recognising, at 
least in the absence of a wrong, that the right to rectify does not equate to an 
immediate trust interest.  
That no trust arises was confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Swift 1st Ltd v 
Chief Land Registrar22 which held that that the earlier case of Malory Enterprises Ltd 
v Cheshire Homes23 (which had held that a trust would arise following a void 
conveyance which nevertheless resulted in registration24) was ‘decided per incuriam 
in so far as the court held that the innocent victim of a forged disposition acquired 
only the legal estate and not the beneficial ownership of the property’.25 However, the 
decision in Swift did not confront directly the case of the forger’s own registration. 
Rather, it concerned an imposter who had never been registered.26The question of the 
status of the registered forger therefore remains outstanding. Might the registered 
forger be denied any property rights (other than the power to transfer onwards as 
confirmed by section 58 together with the owners’ powers provisions) by some tacit 
fraud exception to registration?27 Precedent is unhelpful here, but two clues about the 
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Both contain clauses which bar relief (either by way of an indemnity claim or 
resisting rectification) to a defendant who contributed by his own fraud either to the 
register error or to the loss.28 Such rules presuppose that rectification is the means by 
which the legal estate is to be restored to the former owner, for only then would it be 
necessary to bar the relief otherwise available to the defendant. The legislation 
proceeds on an assumption that the legal estate passes to the registered forger and that 
no trust arises. This provides a strong justification for concluding that the analysis in 
Swift applies also to cases where the forger becomes registered proprietor. 
  There is also the logical argument a fortiori from voidable transfers to be 
considered. Assuming Collings v Lee to be correctly decided (so that a claimant 
acquires an interest under a trust when the new proprietor has obtained the legal estate 
by wrongdoing in cases of impaired consent), then must not the same result occur in 
circumstances when the only difference is that the consent was entirely absent? A 
greater flaw in consent, it may be argued, should not lead to a lesser form of relief. 
Such an argument exerts a powerful influence but ultimately it ignores the 
differentiation brought about by the statute. Voidable transfers are clearly segregated 
from void transfers and have differing legal effects.29 The two are not sufficiently 
analogous to demand application of the logical inference from voidable transfers to 
void transfers by the a fortiori argument.  
 Furthermore, the two regimes could be aligned by overruling Collings v Lee, 
so that where the legal estate has vested in a new proprietor, equitable title could 
never be ‘retained’ on grounds of absent or impaired consent. That certainly would 
have support in policy arguments favouring the simplicity and certainty of property 
rights in a registration scheme and it would sit comfortably with the approach of the 
Court of Appeal in Swift. The weakness of this approach is that it may not satisfy the 
desire to strip a wrongdoer of his gains. While a regime with such a trust might 
provide the claimant with satisfactory reparation for loss through re-vesting or 
indemnity at market value for loss of the land, along with indemnity for damage to the 
land during the defendant’s tenure as proprietor and consequential losses30, there is no 
guarantee that registrar’s recoupment action against the defendant31 would strip all the 
gains he made at the claimant’s expense. The imposition of a trust, on the other hand, 
would supply the basis for recovery. If we accept the stripping of gains as desirable, 
then the policy arguments over the trust do not lie all in one direction.  
 Given the absence of a categorical answer to the issue in the exceptional case 
of wrongdoing, the remainder of the article will acknowledge the possibility of 
entrenchment of Collings v Lee in cases of wrongdoing, but will proceed generally 
upon the ‘power’ theory of the right to rectify. It therefore rejects the view that the 
right to rectify generates an immediate interest in the land. That conclusion coincides 
with the Law Commission’s conviction that the right to rectify is not ‘proprietary’, if 
that denotes the status of a full interest in land rather than some lesser right having in 
rem effect.32 We do not, however, agree with the arguments relied on by the Law 
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Commission to support its conviction, which include the assertion that a right to 
rectify could not be sold and thus could not be accepted as proprietary since the 
transmissibility of the right to rectify is not restricted in the manner suggested.33 
Nevertheless, the conclusion that the right to rectify is less than an interest is 
convincingly justified by the power analysis presented above. 
 
C: Classification and Description 
 
It is possible now to refine the language used to describe the process of re-establishing 
entitlements on the register following a mistaken change to the register. It is clear, 
when considering ‘the right to rectify the register’, that this shorthand is misleading.  
 First, when referring to a ‘right’ to rectify, there is no entitlement as of right.34 
Rather, following a mistake on the register, the register may be rectified.35 This ‘right’ 
to rectify must be understood as a right to seek the intervention of the court, but not to 
a particular outcome. Until the court has actually ordered rectification, the claimant’s 
right is not an immediate proprietary interest in the land.36 It carries no entitlement to 
sue in trespass, for example. The label of ‘right’, considering the absence of a 
corresponding duty, is therefore misleading. Its nature is better described as a ‘power’ 
which embraces a ‘change in a given legal relation’ resulting from ‘some superadded 
fact or group of facts which are under the volitional control of one or more human 
beings’.37 
 Secondly, the difficulty in allocating the ‘right to rectify’ to an established 
category of rights is exacerbated by the issue of standing. It is without question that 
any such power must be available to the former proprietor.  But the LRA does not 
specifically restrict who can apply for the register to be rectified. It is not limited to 
the person whose interest in land was prejudiced by the mistake. As the Court of 
Appeal held in Walker v Burton: 
[T]here is no legal requirement to claim an interest in the registered land 
where the application is to the registrar for the alteration of the register 
as a matter of public law… Anyone could object to the registration of 
the Fell without asserting a better title to it, or any title to it.38  
Thus, in Walker v Burton itself the application was brought not by the former 
owner of the land, but by neighbours aggrieved by the behaviour of the mistakenly 
registered proprietors. All persons having an interest, broadly understood as a factual 
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concern rather than some legal right, can apply for the register to be rectified,39 but it 
would be inappropriate to equate their position with the position of the person whose 
private interest in land was prejudiced by the mistake and who would be restored if 
the rectification claim were successful. The existence of a mistaken registration will 
mean, inevitably, that there will be different classes of applicant. The class with which 
we are concerned here comprises those who will directly benefit from any change 
made to the register as a matter of private law, not those who simply seek rectification 
in the exercise of a general civic right as members of the public.  
For present purposes, in consequence, the nature of a former owner’s 
entitlement to rectify the register against a new proprietor, who acquired otherwise 
than by a wrong against the former owner, is accurately characterised as a private law 
power to vest an interest in oneself conditional on the court’s discretion.  
 
4. Immediate Recipients: Further Issues 
 
We now turn to further issues affecting the immediate recipient: personal liability in 
unjust enrichment; proprietary liability in respect of exchange substitutes; and interim 
profits. 
 
A: Personal Liability 
 
The preceding part established the pure proprietary consequences of defective titles as 
between former owner and new registered proprietor. This part now queries the 
possibility of personal restitutionary relief. The conventional elements of a prima 
facie action in unjust enrichment appear to be made out in the void transfer cases. 
There is enrichment of the new proprietor, without basis, at the expense of the former 
owner. It is the very fact of passing legal title to the new proprietor by registration 
which constitutes the enrichment and necessitates the expanded role for restitution. 
The principal question remaining is how to determine whether the relief takes 
personal or proprietary form. This article does not provide a resolution drawn from 
general principles of unjust enrichment, but instead offers an answer in the particular 
context of the LRA. 
 We argue that the common law rules, including those relating to potential 
personal liability in unjust enrichment, do not apply to void transfers regulated by the 
LRA’s rectification provisions. The statute is designed to afford the claimant a right to 
seek proprietary re-vesting in rectification proceedings, or indemnity in lieu. 
Nevertheless, there may be reasons for a claimant preferring to bring a damages 
action. The claimant might rather have the cash than the return of the land, might 
prefer to avoid embarking on that litigation if he foresees no prospect of success in 
rectification proceedings, might hope for greater returns in unjust enrichment through 
disgorgement of interim profits, or might anticipate that statutory indemnity would be 
reduced on account of his lack of proper care when common law damages in unjust 
enrichment would not be.40  
                                                 
39 See also Roberts v Trustees of Brierfield Mosque REF/2007/0865 (trespassers permitted to 
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40 Contrast LRA 2002, sch 8, para 5(1)(b) (lack of care reduces indemnity), with Kelly v Solari 
(1841) 9 M & W 54, 152 ER 24 (lack of care irrelevant to damages). 
 However, personal actions in unjust enrichment brought for those motives 
should not be permitted to intrude into registered land.41 They would stultify the 
statutory protection for acquirers.42 The protective regime already caters for the 
distribution of entitlements, according to which the defendant either keeps the land or 
relinquishes it in exchange for indemnity which will be measured by market value 
along with consequential losses. This ensures that entry as proprietor in the register 
will enable the proprietor to retain the wealth represented by the land.43 That policy 
would be subverted if a common law personal action could strip the proprietor of the 
wealth inhering in the land.  
 One counter-argument is that this analysis could allow a new proprietor to 
retain the wealth inhering in the land even when he was at fault. Suppose a person 
becomes proprietor by inaccurately stating facts in an affidavit supporting his 
application to become registered by adverse possession. The former owner will be 
able to seek re-vesting rectification and the defendant will find his indemnity reduced 
according to his responsibility for the loss. If he had been able to sell onwards before 
the former owner took any steps, then according to the analysis here there would no 
basis for any claim against him for the value of the proceeds, because assuming the 
former owner received indemnity, the facts would not support any recoupment claim 
of the registrar against the defendant. This enrichment effect is not, however, 
sufficient to displace the analysis presented above. While it may suggest that the 
recoupment provisions ought to be adjusted to meet the case,44 the burden of an 
occasional over-compensation from the widely spread indemnity fund subscriptions 
cannot justify a general liability in unjust enrichment that would mean the demise of 
register reliability. 
 
B: Proprietary Liability in Respect of Exchange Substitutes 
 
Following on from the point concerning the proceeds of sale in the defendant’s hands, 
could there be a proprietary claim against them? Certainly, if the claimant had an 
interest under a trust in the land arising as a result of the defendant’s wrongdoing then 
it would be remarkable to reach any conclusion other than that the proceeds were held 
on trust as the traceable substitute. But if, as proposed earlier, there is a mere 
                                                 
41 A possible exception to this is cases of improper behaviour (including knowing receipt). Personal 
liability was assumed in Law Commission, ‘Land Registration for the Twenty-First Century: A 
Consultative Document’, Law Com. No.254, 1998, para 3.48. Case law has not determined the 
point. See Arthur v Attorney General of the Turks and Caicos Islands [2012] UKPC 30; M. 
Conaglen & A. Goymour, ‘Knowing Receipt and Registered Land’ in Charles Mitchell (ed), 
Constructive and Resulting Trusts (Hart Publishing 2010); Martin Dixon, ‘Knowing Receipt, 
Constructive Trusts and Registered Title” [2012] Conv 439; Nicholas Hopkins, ‘Recipient 
Liability in the Privy Council’ [2013] Conv 61. 
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vendor’s entry to inform their decision to proceed with an acquisition: see Simon Cooper, 
‘Registered Title and the Assurance of Reliability’ in Modern Studies in Property Law (Vol 8, Hart 
Publishing 2015). 
44 Contrast the Scottish position under Land Registration etc (Scotland) Act 2012, s 111(5), whereby 
applicants for registration owe to the registrar an independent duty of reasonable care to ensure the 
application does not lead to register inaccuracies. 
conditional power to re-vest through the right to rectify, then there is no authoritative 
precedent. The question is the setting for important contributions to restitution 
literature.45 Again, however, the great controversy can be avoided because the same 
negative answer as earlier is provided by the statutory context of registered land. 
Proprietary tracing into the proceeds would return the value to the claimant without 
state compensation for the defendant. It would bypass the defendant’s protected 
entitlement to the wealth assured by the land register, and consequently it must be 
resisted on the ground that it is implicitly excluded by the Act. 
 
C: Interim Profits 
 
For interim profits made by the defendant’s use of the land during his period as 
registered proprietor, could the claimant bring an action to recover their value or 
obtain proprietary relief in respect of them? Once more, the answer is that all such 
claims, personal or proprietary, must be implicitly excluded, subject to a caveat where 
the defendant has committed a wrong of a type that permits disgorgement damages. 
The statutory policy of upholding of the reliability of the register, even in favour of 
the person who takes under the defective disposition, requires that the registered 
proprietor must be able to retain the fruits of ownership generated while he is 
proprietor. There may be common law actions that would otherwise have allowed 
such claims: in unregistered land, it is conceivable that a constructive trust imposed at 
rescission of a voidable disposition has backdated effect so as to enable the claim to 
interim profits.46 But such liability cannot be translated into registered land because it 
would simply be incompatible with the statutory scheme that determines the balance 
of entitlements. 
 
5. Enforceability against Remote Recipients 
 
The previous sections canvassed issues concerning the nature of the right to rectify in 
disputes between a former owner and the immediate recipient of registered title to the 
land. This section will now address the question of priorities: against whom other than 
the direct recipient may the right be asserted (or, more accurately, the power 
exercised) and under what conditions? It will be seen that for this purpose the recent 
case law makes no fewer than three categorisations of the right to rectify. 
 Referring to the right to rectify as ‘property’ and ‘proprietary’ is unhelpful in 
this part because it brings the danger of conflating two ideas—its status as an interest 
as opposed to a power, and its in rem reach against persons who were not privy to its 
creation. The first question simply asks whether or not it gives an immediate interest 
and we have already put forward the power analysis in rebuttal. That enables the next 
part of the article to devote attention to the second question which inquires into the 
reach of the right to rectify as against strangers, and so the phrase in rem will be used. 
The right to rectify can certainly be regarded as having in rem quality insofar as it 
may lead to a new registered proprietor becoming bound by a pre-existing claim 
affecting the land, but the more contentious question is whether its reach is regulated 
                                                 
45  For full review, see Birke Haecker, Consequences of Impaired Consent Transactions (Hart 
Publishing 2013), 289-294. 
46 Worthington, ‘The Proprietary Consequences of Rescission’ (n 12) 62-3. 
by its own sui generis provision, by the priority rules of sections 29-30 LRA 2002, or 
by some other system.47  
 
A: Regulation as Sui Generis Right? 
 
The first and simplest option is that the capacity of the right to rectify to affect third 
parties is governed by its own bespoke rules that determine its availability and which 
have no general application to other rights and powers in land. The provisions 
establishing the right to rectify are found in Schedule 4, and they may serve this 
regulating function.  
This option has been taken in some recent case law which concludes that  
following a mistaken registration, rectification is available against all successors 
because either their titles involve a mistake or their reversal is necessary in order to 
make full correction. This is apparent from Gold Harp48 in which the Court of Appeal 
held that the right to rectify arising from the mistaken deletion of a lease could be 
exercised as against a later registered leaseholder who was an innocent purchaser 
without value. It confirms that the right to rectify operates in rem and is not cut off by 
the ‘owners’ powers’ rules which protect a disponee taking from a registered 
proprietor.49 The independent force of the right to rectify is also evident from a 
decision of the adjudicator, Knights Construction (March) Ltd v Roberto Mac Ltd,50 
in which it was held that the right to rectify arising on the erroneous inclusion of 
disputed land in the title of another proprietor could be exercised as against a later 
registered proprietor who was an innocent purchaser for value. This decision not only 
confirms that the right to rectify is unaffected by the ‘owners’ powers’ rules, but goes 
further and necessitates the conclusion that its reach is not cut short by the priority 
rules of sections 29-30 that would otherwise have given immunity to a registered 
transferee for value. The two cases offer powerful support for the argument that the 
right to rectify enjoys a universal persistence against all later acquirers and therefore 
enjoys a special status within the land registration scheme. 
 
B: Regulation as an ‘Interest’? 
 
This sui generis approach is not, however, the only option apparent from the case law. 
The second approach to  the in rem effect of the right to rectify rests on the priority 
rules of general application in the LRA and treats the right to rectify as  an ‘interest’ 
within the meaning of section 29 and 30 for this purpose. The basic rule establishes 
priority according to the chronological order of creation of competing rights.51 The 
special reversal rules of sections 29 and 30, however, protect transferees for value by 
postponing the earlier right as against a later registered transferee, lessee or chargee 
for value unless it is protected by entry on the register or falls within the list of 
overriding interests.52 If these provisions apply to the right to rectify, then it would 
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undoubtedly be a right in rem capable of affecting some later acquirers and not others. 
Again, however, this interpretation remains in doubt.  
 In Gold Harp,53 Underhill LJ doubted the argument that the case would turn 
solely on the question whether the new proprietor had given consideration.54 That 
corresponds to a doubt that the status of the right to rectify was to be governed by the 
priority rules of sections 28-30. Instead, the question was to be decided on the basis of 
schedule 4, paragraph 8, LRA 2002 suggesting the sui generis approach above. 
Likewise, the Court of Appeal in Collings v Lee recognised that there was a ‘powerful 
argument’ in support of the view that the right to rectify could not be governed by the 
rules of sections 28-30.55 In contrast, Patten LJ in Swift56 held that the right was 
capable of being an overriding interest,57 leading to the inference that the in rem 
effect of the right to rectify could be governed by the priority rules of sections 28-30. 
None of the judgments dwelt at length on the issue, and they are unlikely to foreclose 
further argument.. 
 They are not the only cases relevant to the potential categorisation of the right 
to rectify as a matter falling within sections 28-30. In Malory, a case decided under 
the LRA 1925, there was support for the view that the right to rectify was capable of 
being an overriding interest and thus binding according to the old priority rules58; and 
this was extended to the LRA 2002 itself in a decision before the Adjudicator.59 These 
cases therefore provide further momentum in the flow of cases that would classify the 
right to rectify as a right in rem which will be cut off only when the transferee 
protection rules in sections 29-30 apply. Various other cases also recognised that the 
power to rescind a disposition60 and the power to rectify a document61 could be 
overriding interests, but, although they dealt with powers, they are unhelpful in the 
present context as they dealt with equitable claims and not register mistakes which 
engaged the statutory power of rectification. 
 The lack of clarity as to the applicability of sections 28-30 requires closer 
examination of the legislation. The priority rules of sections 28-30 of the LRA apply 
to ‘an interest affecting a registered estate or charge’.62 To fall within the priority 
rules, the right to rectify must bean ‘interest’ for the purposes of these sections. 
However, there is no direct answer within the legislation as to what is meant by 
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‘interest’. It is stated that ‘references to an interest affecting an estate or charge are to 
an adverse right affecting the title to the estate or charge’,63 but this simply transfers 
the ambiguity to ‘adverse right’. There are occasions when it was felt necessary to 
specify expressly that interests are to include certain matters that might be construed 
as powers, such as ‘claims’64 and pending land actions.65 Whether these reflect a 
wider conception of ‘interest’ or, conversely, that the interpretative principle 
expressio unius exclusio alterius should prevent the recognition of any other powers, 
such as the right to rectify, remains unclear from the legislative text.  
Without statutory guidance or definitive case law under the LRA 2002, it is 
necessary to look further afield. The term ‘interest’ should be interpreted to include 
the standard canon of proprietary rights in section 1 of the Law of Property Act 1925 
in order to meet the axiom that the two Acts must be read in line with one another. 
But while the Law of Property Act refers to powers, it lists them independently of the 
references to interests and thus does not support their inclusion within that term. Case 
law goes significantly further. The traditional view is that, in at least some 
circumstances, a power to acquire an interest is not itself an ‘interest’. The 
discrepancy is made clear in numerous judgments which use the term ‘equity’ to 
describe a power in the absence of an interest. Phillips v Phillips,66 for example, 
referred to ‘circumstances that give rise to an equity as distinguished from an 
equitable estate - as for example, an equity to set aside a deed for fraud, or to correct it 
for mistake’67 and it was held that the applicable priority rule differed between them. 
The case was mentioned in Cave v Cave,68 which concluded that ‘the interest of the 
Plaintiff in this case is an equitable interest, and not merely an equity like the equity 
to set aside a deed’.69 The same judge reinforced the distinction in a famous passage 
from Re Armstrong70:  
No two ideas can well be more distinct the one from the other than 
those of “property” and “power”.... A “power” is an individual personal 
capacity of the donee of the power to do something. That it may result 
in property becoming vested in him is immaterial; the general nature of 
the power does not make it property.71  
Following these cases, the statutory term ‘interest’ should normally be regarded as 
excluding powers to acquire property. But that principle is not universal. The cases 
have not spoken with one voice72 leading Thomas to admit that ‘this fundamental 
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distinction between the concepts of power and property has not been preserved in all 
contexts and for all purposes’.73 The extension of the statutory ‘interest’ to the right to 
rectify is simply beset with difficulty that cannot be resolved satisfactorily by 
interpretative means within the four corners of the statute or by reliance on statutes in 
pari materia. 
 
C: Regulation as a ‘Mere Equity’? 
 
It is necessary therefore to consider a third option for explaining the in rem effect of a 
right to rectify: the rules relating to the ‘mere equity’. Section 116 of the LRA 
declares that ‘a mere equity has effect from the time the equity arises as an interest 
capable of binding successors in title’. Categorising the right to rectify as a mere 
equity would therefore bring it within the statutory definition of ‘interest’ in section 
29-30, bypassing the difficulties discussed immediately above, and providing an 
explanation for the case law in section B. There is no decision which decisively 
accepts that the right to rectify may come within the concept of mere equity. Yet there 
are cases in which overtures can be detected. Crawley v Gudipati74 issued a 
‘preliminary view’ that the right to rectify was a mere equity falling within section 
116.75 In further proceedings,76 it was held that that the right to rectify, as an 
‘interest’, was controlled by the priority rule of section 3077 and that the claimant’s 
right to rectify was protected as an overriding interest,78 but the reference to section 
116 was dropped. For that reason, and also for the reason that the decision rested on 
two very different grounds of defect which were not subjected to separate legal 
analysis (flawed attestation and undue influence, the latter not generating a right to 
rectify), the judgment is of limited value. 
 Proudlove v Wood79 offers the strongest indication of the conceptualisation of 
the right to rectify as a mere equity. Proudlove, the registered proprietor, had signed a 
transfer that was void for non est factum. The transferee, Wood, became registered 
and the land was again transferred onwards by him, eventually reaching the Deacons. 
Counsel contended that the right to alter the register was a mere equity within section 
116, it prevailed against third parties generally, and could not be resisted by the 
defendants who had become registered when the claimant was in actual occupation so 
that his mere equity gained overriding status.80 The court appeared to accept this 
reasoning. Insofar as that forms the ratio, the case is authority for the right to rectify 
as mere equity. But there are serious qualifications to be made. First, the court did not 
explicitly hold that the right to rectify was a ‘mere equity’ within section 116, 
although that may be a fair reading of the judicial intention. Second, the relevance of 
the comments on the right’s status as an overriding interest coming within the section 
29-30 priority rules is complicated by the court’s decision that the registration of the 
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Deacons was a rectifiable mistake. The court cautiously declined to address the 
crucial issue of what the proper result might have been had there not been the overlap 
of mistake and overriding interest.81  
 The dominant, albeit unsettled, position appears therefore to be that the 
right to rectify is indeed liable to be postponed under sections 29-30 following a 
registrable transaction completed by registration, but that the route by which this is 
achieved is unclear: as an interest or as a mere equity thus treated as an interest thanks 
to section 116? To examine the merits of these contested approaches, it is necessary to 
engage with the concept of the ‘mere equity’. This has been described by one writer 
as a “grey and murky fog, consistent in depth of colour, the boundaries hazy and ill-
defined”.82 Nevertheless, the classification of the right to rectify as a ‘mere equity’ 
does have certain advantages over the approach of classifying it directly as an interest 
under section 29-30, not least the fact that certain rights which undoubtedly do fall 
into the ‘mere equity’ class (including a right to rectify a document) share certain 
features with the right to rectify the register. The common features include: being 
discretionary in application; comprising a power; being equitable; having prospective 
effect. To dismiss the ‘mere equity’ approach out of hand would therefore be to 
ignore a potentially more suitable route than that of treating the right to rectify as a 
substantive interest. 
Snell defines the mere equity as follows: 
[A] mere equity is an inchoate right binding on specific property. In 
functional terms, to say that a person has a “mere equity” in relation to 
property means that the property is susceptible to an equitable 
proprietary claim if and when the claimant elects to enforce it. The 
claimant must person some further legal act to cause his claim to 
crystallise as an equitable interest.83  
Thus, the key features of the mere equity are that it is a means by which 
another right in land may be acquired; it does not itself give an equitable interest in 
land but is in its nature a power. This neatly encapsulates the key features of the right 
considered here. Furthermore, ‘mere equities’ do not only arise from equitable 
jurisdictions. The label ‘mere equity’ may initially appear inappropriate for statutory 
powers, but the rights which fall into this category are not necessarily the progeny of 
equity - for example, the right to rescind for duress recognised at common law.  
Concluding that the right to rectify is a ‘mere equity’ is not the end of the argument, 
however. Section 116 was intended to be declaratory of the law prior to the enactment 
of the Act and, as such, relies upon the existence of two categories of mere equity: 
mere equities with in rem effect, and mere equities which do not have such effect.84 
The distinction between these two categories of mere equity (those with and without 
in rem effect) relies on whether the mere equity in question is ancillary to an estate in 
land. That the term ‘mere equities’ can cover a range of rights, both with and without 
the ability to bind remote recipients, perhaps explains some of the judicial vacillation 
but does not undermine the argument that the features of the right to rectify align 
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closely with the definition of mere equity. As a result, it is possible to explain why the 
right to rectify, which would not otherwise fall comfortably within the statutory 
concept of ‘interest’ in section 29-30, is treated as being governed by these 
provisions. The best explanation of the current approach by the courts is that 
explicitly or implicitly they are treating the right to rectify as a mere equity. 
Nevertheless, we argue below that as a matter of law reform, a fresh provision 
explaining the nature of the right to rectify is preferable to relying on categorisation as 
a mere equity.  
 
6. Rethinking the Ordering of Rights 
 
Prologue: the Law Commission provisional proposal 
 
The Law Commission’s recent consultation paper seeks responses to its provisional 
proposal that ‘the ability of a person to seek alteration or rectification of the register to 
correct a mistake should not be capable of being an overriding interest’.85 This would 
certainly have the advantage of eliminating the argument that a right to rectify, 
supported by actual occupation, could bind a successor and block the successor’s 
indemnity claim on the ground that it was the overriding interest and not the register 
correction which caused the successor’s loss. But this would do nothing to clarify the 
nature of the right, it would not positively resolve which priority rule applies to the 
right, and it would leave untouched other practical difficulties. 
 Moreover, the proposed reform might introduce a danger of muddying the 
waters further. The new provision would imply that the right to rectify remains within 
sections 28-30 (except for overriding interests) but without explaining why. Our 
contention is that the better approach to reform would be to fix the underlying issues 
by explicit enactment of a bespoke provision concerning the nature and in rem effect 
of the right to rectify. To provide a foundation for future coherence in the right to 
rectify, whether through legislative clarification or judicial exposition, it will be 
necessary to understand the proper place of the right to rectify within the ordering of 
estates, interests, rights, powers, and mere equities, and their allocation amongst the 
priority institutions.  
 
A: Harmonising transferees’ protection from mere equities and rights to rectify 
 
It was established above that there is a high degree of correspondence between the 
right to rectify and the traditional constituents of the mere equity class. Indeed, we 
argued that classifying the right to rectify as a subset of mere equity represents the 
best way to account for the dominant case law trend. However, with a view to 
possible reform, we argue that the ideal way to conceptualise the right to rectify is not 
to rely on categorisation by family resemblance.86  
Using a polythetic classification, as opposed to necessary and sufficient 
conditions, to decide what amounts to a ‘mere equity’ would introduce significant 
indeterminacy. That approach is unsatisfactory here because the capacity to bind third 
parties is at stake. So, while we argued above that the ‘mere equity’ analysis offers the 
best route for describing and bringing coherence to the past case law, we also argue 
that a superior system could be achieved through legislative reform.  
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of a bespoke provision which clarifies the nature of the right and its in rem reach. The 
issue is whether the right to rectify should be available in principle against all 
successors (which has been considered elsewhere87) or whether it should be deferred 
to a transferee for value, and in the latter case whether the new provision should 
simply declare that the transferee protection rules of sections 29-30 apply to rights to 
rectify as well as other established ‘interests’. Even though that approach would 
confirm the trend seen in the current case law, there are multiple reasons to be wary of 
it. 
 First, bringing the right to rectify under the control of sections 29-30 would 
require consideration of the interaction with indemnity. The Law Commission 
suggests that when the right affects a transferee by virtue of being an overriding 
interest, the transferee will be denied indemnity.88 The basis for this is an assumption 
that the right to rectify - a discretionary claim accompanied by indemnity - undergoes 
metamorphosis in the event of a transfer so as to become a non-discretionary 
entitlement unaccompanied by indemnity. However, we argue that protection should 
merely prevent the new registered proprietor from raising the defence of transferee for 
value. It should not qualitatively enhance the claimant’s relief or remove indemnity.89  
For sections 29-30 to be a satisfactory vehicle for the right to rectify, this issue must 
be resolved and it must be resolved alike whether protection occurs through actual 
occupation or entry on the register.  
 Second, any requirement to protect the right to rectify by a register entry so as 
to avoid deferral under sections 29-30 would represent a significant advance beyond 
the current duties on property owners. Owners are currently expected to lodge their 
expressly-created interests for registration promptly after acquisition but to introduce 
a requirement that rights to rectify be registered in order to bind successors would 
demand registration at a time when there is no transaction being handled by the 
owner’s lawyer, and it implies that property owners should consider themselves under 
a practical responsibility to monitor the register and be on guard for mistaken deletion 
of their rights so that prompt steps may be taken. 
 Third, if a transferee protection rule replicating sections 29-30 were adopted, 
this would presuppose that the right to rectify could suitably be protected in the same 
manner as an interest through actual occupation or a notice on the register. It may 
appear desirable to allow a claimant to lodge a unilateral notice to protect his position 
and warn transferees of a heightened risk of alteration,90 yet there would be doubtful 
consequences. It would discriminate against litigants seeking rectification without a 
rival claim of their own, and would have the potential to perpetuate conflicting claims 
to title on the register. In addition, applying these protective mechanisms would 
undermine the policy that interests protected by actual occupation should be readily 
                                                 
87 Cooper, ‘Resolving Title Conflicts in Registered Land’ (n 1). 
88 Law Commission, ‘Updating the Land Registration Act 2002’ (n 2), [13.60-63]. 
89 That is implicit in Proudlove v Wood (n 79) [29]. We therefore disagree with Patrick Milne, 
‘Guarantee of Title and Void Dispositions’ [2015] Conv 356, 363 that overriding status connotes 
loss of discretion and indemnity. 
90 It appears to have been allowed by the registry: Barclays Bank plc v Guy [2008] EWCA Civ 452, 
[2008] 2 EGLR 74 and Barclays Bank plc v Guy (No. 2) [2010] EWCA Civ 1396, [2011] 1 WLR 
681, and its delayed lodgement by the solicitors was reviewed at length in the action against the 
solicitors in Guy v Pannone LLP [2009] EWCA Civ 30, [2009] 7 EG 90 (CS).  
discoverable through inquiry. Having already made a disposition under circumstances 
of impairment, the occupier may be unable to formulate a simple response to a 
purchaser’s inquiry, yet this conflicts with the policy that the inquiries must be 
capable of generating a clear conclusion so as to avoid deterring purchasers by 
enmeshing them in speculation over the nature of adverse claims.91  
 Fourth, the extension of sections 29-30 to the right to rectify would create a 
fundamental deviation between the protection afforded by proprietorship registration 
and notice entry. Where a claimant has been mistakenly deleted as proprietor yet 
remains in actual occupation, the extension of sections 29-30 would ensure that any 
new proprietor could not raise a plea of protected transferee. But the opposite result 
would follow where the claimant had lodged a notice that was mistakenly deleted, as 
section 29(3) prohibits the claim to an overriding interest in these circumstances. 
While this effect of the section was intended at the time of enactment in order to 
reduce overriding interests,92 its discriminatory effect was not discussed. Claimants in 
actual occupation who have suffered from mistaken deletion of a notice rather than a 
proprietorship entry seemingly merit equal protection; and remote purchasers that fail 
to make enquiry of an actual occupier who had protected by notice rather than 
proprietorship entry seemingly merit equal penalty.93 
 Whilst there appears an acceptable policy choice between the preservation of 
the right to rectify as against all comers and cutting it short as against transferees for 
value, in the latter case adjustments would have to be made to ensure a transparent 
and integrated regime. Neither the Law Commission’s suggestion of excluding rights 
to rectify from overriding status, nor the explicit inclusion of rights to rectify within 
section 29-30, would achieve that. 
 
B: Integrating void and voidable transactions 
 
An alternative reform option could be a unitary provision for altering the register that 
would amalgamate the rules for defective consent dealings through updating and 
correcting, thereby unifying void and voidable titles.  
 Despite their separate doctrinal treatment in current law, void and voidable 
titles have much in common when applied to registered land, and the courts have 
already been cautious to avoid ruling out the possibility that voidable transactions 
                                                 
91 National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth (n 61) 1234, 1238. Nevertheless, it was accepted in 
principle that a power to rescind could have fallen within the former Land Registration Act 1925, s 
70(1)(g): Bank of Scotland v Hussain [2008] EWHC 1669 and [2010] EWHC 2812. A right to 
rectify an instrument was also an overriding interest under s 70(1)(g): Nurdin and Peacock plc v 
DB Ramsden and Co. Ltd [1999] 1 EGLR 119 (Ch) 124-126; Goodyear v Willis [1999] EGCS 32; 
Bradbury Investments Ltd  v Hicklane Properties Ltd (Unreported, 7 June 2007, Ch) [83] (upheld 
[2008] EWCA Civ 691, [2009] 1 P & CR 2); Sahota v RR Leisureways Ltd [2010] EWHC 3114, 
[76]. See Susan Pascoe, ‘Purchasers of Leases: Beware Landlord's Rights of Rectification Under 
Section 70(1)(g) of the Land Registration Act 1925’ [1999] Conv 421. This problem is, however, 
of limited significance as typical conveyancing practice is not to inquire into the nature of family 
occupiers’ rights but simply to seek a waiver. Furthermore, the recent decision in Mortgage 
Express v Lambert [2016] EWCA Civ 555 suggests that in any case rights to rectify, if indeed 
mere equities or some kind of sui generis proprietary interest, would be susceptible to 
overreaching on transactions involving two trustees. 
92 Law Commission & HM Land Registry, ‘Land Registration for the Twenty-First Century’ (n 8) 
[5.12]. 
93 This argument would vanish if the right to rectify were precluded from overriding interest status as 
provisionally proposed in Law Commission, ‘Updating the Land Registration Act 2002’ (n 2), 
[13.80]. 
might come under the rectification power.94 Both involve defective consent. Both are 
effective to vest title upon registration. Both require an election and proceedings by 
the victim in order to recover. Both require a court order to secure recovery. Both 
have prospective effect that excludes any interim liability for the defendant’s 
consumption and disposal. The similarities prompt inquiry as to whether in registered 
land the two types of defective consent should be regulated alike. Doing so would 
have the benefits of simplicity and of enhancing register reliability for those taking 
under a voidable transaction.95 It would also offer a convenient loss-spreading system 
through indemnity.96  
 Currently, the statutory differentiation of void and voidable titles through their 
means of reversal—rectifying and updating respectively—causes undesirable 
deviation in their third party effects. One example occurs where the immediate 
recipient under a defective consent transfer makes an onward gift to a donee who 
takes possession. If void, and thus falling under the right to rectify, the donee will be 
presumptively immune from attack. If voidable, the donee will be bound by the mere 
equity and the register will be updated upon setting aside the transaction. The claim 
would fall within updating as it would do no more than publicise the existing 
entitlement. It would not be regulated by the concept of mistake because on the 
present view that requires a register change which at the time of the change was not 
supported by a valid mandate in the form of either a property interest or an 
entitlement which would be a proprietary interest but for the suspensive effect of the 
LRA pending registration.97 On that view, to register the person in whom property 
vests subject to a liability to rescission is to register the right person, and is no 
mistake. If rescission subsequently occurs through the order setting aside, then that 
new event creates the foundation for registering or updating, but it cannot support a 
claim that the proprietor was erroneously registered at the time of entry.98 In 
consequence, the lesser impairment to consent gives the more powerful right. 
 Another charge is that the current differentiation of void and voidable titles 
also leads to results that are logical but repellent. For instance, the immediate 
recipient under a transaction procured by his own undue influence who sells onwards 
is able to keep the sale proceeds,99 while the remote purchaser is burdened with the 
loss if he failed to detect the victim in occupation. In that case, the overbearing 
influencer, who is the immediate cause of loss, makes a profit from his actions and 
forces the unconnected remote purchaser to suffer the loss of title.100 In terms of 
indemnity it creates a dubious distinction. For the voidable title, the remote purchaser 
would be ineligible for indemnity, but it would in principle be available to the remote 
purchaser acquiring a void title.101  
                                                 
94 Baxter v Mannion [2011] EWCA Civ 120, [2011] 1 WLR 1594, [31], ‘I would reserve my 
position’; Garwood v Bank of Scotland plc (n 11) [72], ‘I do not have to decide this issue’. 
95 LRA 2002, sch 4, para 3(2). 
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97 See Cooper, ‘Regulating Fallibility’ (n 1). 
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purchaser: Law Society, Standard Conditions of Sale (5th ed), cl.3.1.2(b). There may be liability 
where the transferee conceals by misrepresentation the transferor’s occupation from the remote 
purchaser (Vale v Armstrong [2004] EWHC 1160, [2004] 24 EG 148 (CS)). 
101 LRA 2002, sch 8, para 5, subject to possible deduction for lack of care, which is especially likely 
now that the rights of actual occupiers are binding only if the occupation was ‘obvious on a 
reasonably careful inspection’: LRA 2002, sch 3, para 2(c)(i). 
 Those arguments collectively have force but they are not sufficient to justify 
assimilation. They overlook two important attributes of voidable titles. First, a 
voidable transaction may possess two dimensions: a transfer of property and an 
assumption of personal obligations. The traditional rule for voidable transactions is 
that setting aside is necessary not only for the purpose of establishing the basis for 
recovery of the property but also to ensure that any remaining personal obligations are 
terminated. The rectification power affects only the proprietary entitlements on the 
register and is unable to affect continuing obligations which need to be rescinded. 
Bringing the regulation of voidable transactions within the rectification power would 
be inadequate to achieve this. 
 Second, all voidable transactions for value will require the mutual unwinding 
of dealings unless the transferee’s performance is entirely executory. Rules exist to 
protect the position of the immediate transferee in the event that the property is 
reclaimed, recognising that the transferee’s participation in bringing about the 
transferor’s defect in consent may have been innocent. The protection is achieved by 
imposing terms in the judgment setting aside so as to secure counter-restitution. To 
bring voidable titles within the rectification power would bypass this process. It 
would thus deny the transferee security because case law has indicated that 
rectification, or the discretionary refusal of rectification, cannot be ordered on 
terms,102 thus leaving the transferee no greater relief than if the transaction had been 
void.103  
 Redirecting voidable transfers into the rectification power is not the answer if 
we are to retain a system which provides for the termination of personal obligations 
and pre-emptive counter-restitution. Even though it is undesirable to amlagamate 
procedures in relation to void and voidable transactions, there remains scope for 
equalising specific aspects of their effects. In particular, the differing consequences 
for discretion and indemnity could be ironed out through targetted minor reforms, in 
each case making the judicial discretion subject to the proprietor in possession rule 
and allowing indemnity in principle.  Such minor alterations, coupled with an explicit 
bespoke provision dealing with the right to rectify, prescribing its nature and priority, 
represent the best solution to the current confusion.  
 
7. Conclusion 
 
This article has demonstrated, through a review of the current mixed case law, that the 
right to rectify and its current application to immediate recipients is best understood 
as in the nature of a power, giving rise not to an interest in land, but an ability to call 
on the help of the court to invoke its discretionary authority to confer such an interest. 
The conclusion was reached by considering not only the right to rectify following a 
void transaction, but looking, by analogy, at the right to rescind and update the 
register following a voidable transaction. As against remote recipients, it became clear 
that whilst the courts in general seem to favour the right being capable of having an in 
rem effect, what is less clear is the basis of this effect, be it as a sui generis right 
capable of assertion against all remote recipients, as an interest dealt with under 
sections 29-30 in its own right, or as a ‘mere equity’ dealt with under section 116 and 
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therefore susceptible to losing priority on the basis of sections 29-30. Despite the 
courts’ inconsistency on this question, our analysis has shown that the mere equity 
route is the best way in which the current case law can be explained, relying on the 
similarities between the right to rectify and existing mere equities. 
 This approach is not satisfactory as a matter of policy, however, because it 
rests the nature of the right to rectify on the ill-defined mere equity, it couples the 
right to rectify to unsuitable priority rules, and is insensitive to the special role of the 
right to rectify within the land registration system. The solution is not to amalgamate 
the rectification and updating powers, nor to bring the right to rectify within the 
priority rules of section 29-30. To address the problem, we advocate measures which 
will strike at the root cause of the problems and go far beyond the Law Commission’s 
provisional proposal to excise the overriding interest characterisation. We recommend 
the enactment of a bespoke provision which identifies precisely how the right to 
rectify fits within the structures of land registration: that requires a statutory resolution 
of the nature of the right and declaration of its in rem reach. The current conceptual 
confusion produces a picture of inconsistency: in a system designed to promote clarity 
and ease of transaction, this confusion ought to be rectified at the first possible 
opportunity. 
